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Abstract 
Vietnam’s agrarian system has profoundly changed since the government initiated its renovation 
policy in 1986. Various policy directives and institutional reforms have been aimed at increasing the 
production of cash crops for the export markets and ensuring the nation’s food security. The 
government has undertaken considerable investments in irrigation and water control to boost local 
rice production, especially in the Mekong Delta. Today, a large water bureaucracy plans, implements 
and maintains the hydraulic infrastructure, but farmers have to contribute to funding and managing 
the irrigation systems. In this context, water user groups started to emerge from the 1990s onwards. 
This study on the trajectory of group development in Can Tho City shows that party-state authorities 
strongly stimulate group formation processes and organise the collaboration between farmers and 
the state. As a result, water user groups have become an integral part of local water management 
and instrumental in meeting the state-mandated production targets in agriculture.  
 
Keywords: Water resources management; Vietnam; Mekong Delta; water user groups; irrigation; 
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1 Introduction 
For several decades, the development of large-scale water control and irrigation infrastructure has 
been a common practice to boost agriculture production in many parts of the world, including 
Vietnam. Although centralised water systems have been successful in some regards, the sustainable 
management of these facilities has proven to be difficult. In particular, the investment, operation and 
maintenance costs of the irrigation systems have turned out to be high and the performance capacity 
tends to deteriorate over time (Meinzen-Dick et al. 1997: 18). As most of the larger systems were 
solely managed by the state, critics argued for decentralisation and the stronger involvement of 
water users in the management process (Ostrom 1990, Molle et al. 2009: 339-340). From this, the 
concept of water user associations emerged as an alternative option for managing water systems at 
the local level and, from the 1980s onwards, the establishment of water user associations was 
globally encouraged. Yet, their impact varied greatly. 
Various scholars who investigated the performance of these associations during the 1990s found that 
it was the institutional setup which really matters: First, the political institutional framework, 
consisting of water laws and water policies; and second, the association’s internal regulations and 
management practices (Bandaragoda 2000, Subramaniam et al. 1997: xi-xiv). In addition, it became 
clear that the wider political context not only defines and limits the space for water policy reforms 
but also strongly shapes their outcome. In post-Soviet Central Asia for instance, thousands of large 
water user associations were established in a top-down and bureaucratic manner and, as a result, 
they were unable to meet the assigned responsibilities. Case studies from Uzbekistan, in particular, 
revealed that the water user association model was not fully adopted but rather shaped in a way that 
it would fit the country’s state-controlled system of water governance (Veldwisch 2008: 147ff.; 
Abdullaev et al. 2010: 1036).  
These findings, among others, raised questions about the particular characteristics and practices of 
water governance in authoritarian regimes (see e.g. the special issue of Water Alternatives 2010, Vol. 
3/ 3). The one-party state of Vietnam, where decision-making powers are solely held by the Vietnam 
Communist Party (VCP) and its state organs, has been one of the discussed examples. Water 
resources management in Vietnam is, to date, under strict state control and irrigation constitutes the 
dominant concern. This is because the government puts special emphasis on rural production (both 
for export and national food security) and undertakes high investments in order to double or even 
triple rice cropping in the country’s deltas and coastal plains. Although central planning still prevails 
(Huu Pham Cong 2012), local state agencies have increasingly become in charge of managing the 
systems on the ground. With the expansion of the hydraulic infrastructure, water users gradually 
engaged in groups to organise pumping and drainage activities. These groups differ from the above-
mentioned water user associations, as they were initiated by the farmers themselves and less 
formalised. During the last decade, however, the state has become increasingly engaged in 
promoting the development of water user groups. Taken as a whole, the water control and irrigation 
management nexus has become more and more complex and so far, there has been little research 
on the corresponding practices, in particular at the local level.  
This paper therefore aims at investigating the contemporary institutional setup of irrigation 
management in the Mekong Delta, South Vietnam. By taking the rise of water user groups as a 
starting point, the paper draws on a survey and other empirical research in Can Tho City, Mekong 
Delta, where such groups started to emerge during the 1990s. The development of these groups is 
considered in two respects: first in the specific ecological context of rural production in the Mekong 
Delta (which will be explored in the following section), and second in the context of economic and 
administrative reform as well as political practice in Vietnam. In the latter, we briefly describe the 
contemporary political system and outline the main institutional reforms in the water sector since 
the renovation policy (Đổi mới) of 1986. We then analyze how these reforms have been applied in 
the study area, drawing particular attention to the interface between local state management and 
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farmers. With regard to water user groups, we will highlight three aspects: first, the local history and 
profiles of water user groups; second, state interventions in an attempt to formalise and manage the 
groups; and third, the groups’ (and more generally, farmers‘) contributions in cost and labour to the 
development and maintenance of the water infrastructure. Finally, we relate the emergence of water 
user groups in Can Tho City to the overall framework of the government’s rural production and food 
security policy and critically review the rhetoric of community participation in the field of water 
resources management.  
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2 The Mekong Delta: Ecology, agricultural policy and natural 
resources management 
The Mekong Delta is a particularly water-rich area where the alteration between rainy and dry 
seasons and annual flooding dominate the water-flow regime (Nguyen Van Sanh et al., 1998: 20). The 
delta is known for its unique river-water civilisation, where people settle along the waterways, live in 
elevated houses, trade goods on watercourses and combine farming with fishery (Miller, 2003; Le 
Anh Tuan et al., 2007: 22-23). Water, therefore, has always played a predominant role in the local 
economy with investments in water transportation, for instance, starting in pre-colonial times (Biggs 
2004). Water engineering, which was introduced by the French in the late 19th century and gathered 
momentum after Vietnam’s reunification in 1975, represents another important strand of local 
water-related history (Biggs 2004, Kakönen et al., 2006: 23; Evers and Benedikter, 2009: 432). Until 
the 1970s, most farmers planted floating and rain-fed rice, but with the Green Revolution, greater 
cropping intensities and higher yield varieties were introduced and, as part of the socialist 
agricultural policy, their adoption was enforced (Ngyuen Huu Chiem, 1994; Trung Dinh Dang, 2010: 
91). Related state investments in water control and irrigation systems were substantial and even 
increased after 1986, when the rural production system gradually changed and ambitious economic 
growth plans were being implemented. Reforms to the rural credit system and the increasing 
availability of agrochemicals proved to be effective stimulants for promoting farmers’ productivity 
(French Government, 2004: 10-11). Moreover, dyke constructions, aimed at protecting rural farms 
from flood disasters and improving opportunities for double and triple rice cropping, were 
continuously enhanced (Pham Cong Huu, 2012) and salinity control measures were set up in coastal 
areas to increase freshwater availability (Käkönen, 2008: 207). As a result, an extensive network of 
hydraulic infrastructure, comprising more than 13,000 km of axis and primary canals, 13,000 km of 
flood control dykes, over 900 sluice gates and more than 1,000 pumping stations cut across the 
landscape (Vietnam Netherlands Cooperation, 2011: 29). Thus, the delta is nowadays labeled as 
‘man-made’ (Biggs et al., 2009: 203) and naturally, farming practices have changed. 
To date, 85 per cent of the delta is still used for agriculture and the region provides about half of the 
country’s rice yields and 90 per cent of its export tonnage (Le Anh Tuan et al., 2007: 18-27). In 
addition, local farming systems diversified and, since the 1990s, aquaculture, forestry and 
horticulture have also expanded (Vormoor, 2010: 11-14). Altogether, the region plays a leading role 
in Vietnam’s food security and national economy on the whole. Moreover, ambitious growth plans, 
such as the ‘Mekong Delta Master Plan’, aim at developing the delta into a “global centre for 
agricultural production” by 2050 (Prime Minister, 2009). To achieve these goals, water resources 
management, land use planning1, technical innovations and industrial food processing and 
preservation have to be strengthened (ibid).  
                                                     
1
 Land use is regulated by the central and local governments. With regard to agriculture production, local state 
agencies are responsible for identifying suitable land for rice production and thereafter strictly protecting these 
areas (Nguyen Hieu Trung, 2006: 1). Land use certificates and other legal provisions are means of enforcing the 
proposed land use. Markussen et al. (2009: 5) found that although reforms of the Land Law ‘nominally granted 
farmers the right to decide what to grow […] in practice it is very difficult for farmers to change or remove 
restrictions on their plots’. According to the Mekong Delta Master Plan, 1.8 million ha should be cultivated as 
paddy land by 2020. In addition, 27% of the agricultural land should be reserved for vegetable, fruit and maize 
cropping, as well as aquaculture and livestock breeding (Government of Vietnam, 2009). The current land use 
plan of Can Tho City, where rice cultivation remains predominant, also shows the tendency to decrease rice 
land in favor of crop diversification. Moreover, integrated farming models, in which rice and fish production are 
combined, for example, have recently been introduced (Pham Cong Huu, 2011). 
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The study area of Can Tho City, a municipality which, in administrative terms, is equivalent to a 
province, is located in the heart of the Mekong Delta. Situated in the alluvial soil and freshwater zone 
of the delta (Nguyen Duy Can et al., 2007: 82), Can Tho City possesses fertile land and enjoys 
freshwater resources suitable for the cultivation of rice, cash crops and fish. Compared to other parts 
of the Mekong Delta, Can Tho City is only moderately affected by flooding and rarely by salinity 
intrusion2 (UNDP and MARD, 2001: 2). The municipality is divided into nine districts (five rural and 
four urban)3. 
 
Figure 1: Can Tho City: Administrative boundaries and the 8 case study communes  
 
 
Field research between 2008 and 2010 aimed at capturing the institutional set up of local water 
management agencies at municipal, district and commune/ward levels. In this respect, cadres of 
respective state agencies were interviewed at all three levels. In addition, 2 group interviews with 
farmers and community representatives were organised in each of the 4 selected districts (in total, 8 
communes were included; see map above). In the same communes, 64 water user groups were 
                                                     
2
 Floods tend to occur every year during the rainy season when three major factors coincide: a high flow 
discharge from upstream, heavy and continuous rainfall and high tidal flow from the sea (Le Anh Tuan et al., 
2007). The most flood-prone districts of Can Tho City province are Thot Not, Vinh Thanh and O Mon district, 
with inundation levels ranging from 0.6 – 1.5m, lasting for about three months during the peak of the rainy 
season (UNDP and MARD, 2001: 7). 
3
 Following the classification into rural and urban administrative units, districts and communes are viewed as 
rural entities, while the respective urban units are classed as wards and towns. In addition, communes are 
divided into hamlets (villages). Boundary shifts and administrative rearrangements of districts and provinces 
are highly frequent (Waibel, 2010: 16 f.).  
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identified and thereafter included in a questionnaire-based survey. Considering that this was the first 
investigation of water user groups in the study area, the survey was explorative in nature. It basically 
aimed at capturing the history and evolution as well as the current activities and management 
practices of the groups. The complementary information drawn from the interviews allowed for a 
better understanding of what happens beyond the groups’ boundaries. 
 7 
The main characteristics of the four districts where the research was conducted are summarised in 
the table below.  
 
Table 1: Characteristics of districts in the study area 
 Rural/urban 
Classification 
Population Area (km²) Population 
Density 
(pers./km²) 
Aquaculture 
Production 
 (tons) 
Agricultural 
Production 
(tons) 
Vinh Thanh Rural 154,225 410.35 375 21,084 1,485,070 
Thot Not Urban 197,853 171.29 492 69,770 597,610 
Co Do Rural 181,187 401.83 450 19,746 1,464,899 
Phong Dien Rural 104,945 123.59 849 3,586 346,704 
Source: Provincial Statistics Office of Can Tho City, 2008; District Statistics Offices, 2007 
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3 Vietnam’s one-party state and Đổi mới reforms in the water 
sector 
The Vietnamese political system is still characterised as “Leninist” (Fforde, 2009), bureaucratic 
(Porter, 1993) and “soft authoritarian” (Thayer, 2009), and the state’s omnipresence4 aims at 
maintaining control over all spheres of social and political life (Koh, 2001). However, economic 
liberalisation, decentralisation, the introduction of ‘rule of law’ principles and other administrative 
reforms initiated with Đổi mới (‘renovation’) in 1986 provided space for the development of private 
entrepreneurship and other forms of non-state organisations, including associations, which were 
prohibited prior to Đổi mới5. As a result, the institutional landscape has been gradually changing 
from mono-organisational socialism (Thayer 1995) to increasingly pluralism. Powers are nowadays 
“more scattered” (Gainsborough, 2010: 166-167); yet, a significant retreat of the state cannot be 
observed (ibid: 169). The related contestations and evolving practices, which will be discussed in this 
paper, are conceptualised as ‘everyday politics’ (Kerkvliet 2005). These everyday politics are, on the 
one hand, characterised by social forces which indeed can influence national policymaking and, on 
the other hand, by manifest weaknesses of central state power at the grassroots level (Koh, 2001)6. 
The one-party state shows strength by  monopolising political power, but has obvious weaknesses 
regarding the coherence of governance in its decentralised system.    
3.1 Đổi mới water sector reforms 
This section briefly outlines some of the key elements of Vietnam’s water sector reforms and how 
these reforms have been implemented over recent years. According to Vietnam’s first water law, 
promulgated in 1998, water is solely managed by the state and state management functions were to 
be re-organised. Subsequently, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) was given 
the responsibility for water services, while the newly established Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment (MONRE) was in charge of water resources management7. Water policies, which are 
developed in Hanoi, are binding for all levels of public administration, including the provinces 
(municipality), districts and communes (ward, town) (Dixon, 2004: 17; Molle and Chu Thai Hoanh, 
2008: 30). At the provincial level, ministries are represented by their respective departments (e.g. 
Department of National Resources and Environment (DONRE)), which are then divided into 
specialised centres and agencies. Provincial departments function and operate under the authority of 
the provincial People’s Committee. The latter holds executive state power within its jurisdiction and, 
                                                     
4
 Party cells are established in all state agencies, organisations and state enterprises with more than five staff. 
5
 The most important new legal provisions in this regard were the Law on Cooperatives (1996), the revision of 
the Civil Code (2005) and the Enterprise Law (2000). 
6
 Kerkvliet (2003: 40-45) showed that farmers successfully resisted state-imposed agricultural collectivisation 
efforts and Heberer and Kohl (1999: 165-175) found that citizens started to engage in informal private sector 
activities even before these became legalised. Đổi mới, in fact, confirmed market-based economic principles 
and the return to household-based production at a point in time when they were already practised by parts of 
the population. In this view, major economic and other reforms came as a (late) state response to social 
practices.    
7
 MARD is in charge of hydraulic infrastructure, irrigation, aquaculture, disaster prevention and water service 
delivery, while MONRE is responsible for the management of land, water and the environment, including water 
resources assessment, water allocation and the management of surface water, groundwater and water quality 
(Nguyen Thi Phuong Loan, 2010a; Waibel, 2010: 8). A new water policy, issued in 2006, introduces IWRM 
(Integrated Water Resources Management) principles and provides for a number of regulations and sanctions 
for water control and protection (ibid: 34-39). 
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through decentralisation, gained increasing autonomy, at least in the fiscal and administrative 
domains (Benedikter, 2008; Vietnam Consultative Group Meeting, 2009). The provincial authorities 
also hold the power to direct district administrations8. 
Provincial authorities enjoy some degree of sovereignty with regard to their institutional set up 
(Vasavakul, 1999: 168-170) and there is “substantial room in practice (though not necessarily legally) 
to ‘reinterpret‘ centralised guidelines” (Fritzen, 2006: 9). An Integrated Water Resources 
Management (IWRM) process, for instance, has been formally adopted by the government but only 
partially implemented at the local level (Waibel et al. 2011). Similarly, provincial legal frameworks in 
the water sector tend to diverge (Nguyen Thi Phuong Loan 2010a).  
3.2 Mass organisations and entrepreneurship in the field of water 
resources management 
Table 6 (annex) illustrates that, with the exception of water quality control, organisations and actors 
other than state agencies fulfill numerous tasks and responsibilities in water management (as is 
exemplified in the case of Can Tho City). These include the mass organisations which, since their 
establishment in the 1930s, have been given the mandate to enforce Communist Party policies at 
local levels. In order to fulfill this mandate, mass organisations operate branches along the same 
administrative lines as the state. Following Đổi mới, they also have adopted more practical tasks, 
such as micro-credit delivery, and both the government and international donors often call upon 
their cooperation when they implement projects (ADB, 1999: 3-6; Norlund, 2007: 10-11). With regard 
to the water sector, the most important mass organisations in Can Tho City are: the Farmers’ 
Association, which promotes irrigation and aquaculture activities; the Women’s Union, which 
provides health education as well as credits for water supply and sanitation; and the Red Cross, 
which supports flood and disaster mitigation programmes (Interview 09.06.2010 in Can Tho). 
Furthermore, private investors have gradually surfaced. The socialisation policy, in particular, 
enhanced the transfer of state functions, such as water services, and associated costs to the private 
sector and citizens. Though state-owned enterprises have not automatically vanished, as Painter 
explains: 
The stance and viewpoint of Vietnam is that socialisation of some activities in the public 
sector […] can be by no means considered as privatisation. Socialisation will be 
conducted under the principle that ‘the work is shared between the State and the 
people, and the State will take the principal role, exercising State management 
functions’ (Government Steering Committee, 2000b: 18) (Painter, 2005: 274). 
The establishment of provincial irrigation and drainage management companies (IDMCs) and the 
shift towards water pricing policies in the late 1980s (Barker et al., 2004: 27; Fontenelle et al., 2007: 
170) is just one example of this shift; formerly, hydraulic works and maintenance have been under 
the auspices of the central state. Furthermore, the Ordinance on Exploitation and Protection of 
Irrigation Works (National Assembly of Vietnam, 2001) has created business opportunities in 
drainage and pumping services as well as well drilling. In addition to private entrepreneurs, 
cooperatives (which are defined as ‘types of enterprise’9) also engage in this sector, although as our 
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 At the district level, ‘offices’ fulfill the respective state management functions, and some of these also have 
operational units at the commune level, such as health stations and agriculture extension services. 
9
 Following one important Đổi mới reform, membership in agricultural cooperatives became voluntary in 1988 
and thereafter drastically reduced. In Can Tho City, the number of cooperatives fell from 3,969 in 1986 to 1,132 
in 1996 (DARD of Can Tho City, 2008). However, with the new Law on Cooperatives, promulgated in 1996 and 
amended in 2003, cooperatives were redefined as ‘a type of enterprise’, obliged to undertake business 
registration and submit written reports to the local government (Government of Vietnam, 2004). These so-
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data indicates, they have experienced problems in successfully managing their organisation and 
businesses. Other private and semi-privatised firms offer maintenance works in some of the 
communes (Evers and Benedikter, 2009). With regard to domestic water supply, a few entrepreneurs 
have recently (2004) started to establish rural water supply stations at the district level, while 
cooperatives withdrew from this field of operation a couple of years ago (interviews with state 
agents in O Mon District, 23./24.03.2009). Finally, the state-run IDMC of Can Tho City (founded in 
1992) was dissolved in 1999 and converted into a joint stock water engineering company (interview: 
Can Tho Joint Stock Hydraulic Engineering Company, 11.11.2008).  
3.3 The involvement of water users 
The Grassroots Democracy Decree10, issued in 1998, is so far one of the most significant instruments 
for strengthening the local governance system beyond the provincial level (Benedikter, 2008: 66-74; 
Fritzen, 2006: 3f.). The decree provides for stronger involvement of people’s voices in local politics 
and, to some extent, for the development of community- and participatory-driven approaches (Bach 
Tan Sinh, 2002: 122; Zingerli, 2004: 56). In the context of water resources management, this policy 
provided the grounds for participatory irrigation management (PIM) (MARD, 2004b) and the 
promulgation of new legislation on cooperative and water user groups (e.g. Decree 151 on 
Cooperative Groups (Government of Vietnam 2007)). In Can Tho City, PIM has however not been 
adopted to date (Pham Cong Huu, 2011: oral communication). Nevertheless, it is widely 
acknowledged that farmers, households and community based organisations (CBOs) are involved in 
managing the water resources for production and domestic use (Nguyen Xuan Tiep, 2008b: 297-299).  
CBOs are a rather recent phenomenon. Surprisingly, the first survey on civil society organisations in 
Vietnam stated that more than a hundred thousand community-based groups existed in the country 
(Norlund et al., 2006: 48). Detailed information on these groups was however lacking. Nevertheless, 
the growing institutional diversity is considered a challenge by many state organs (Vasavakul, 2003: 
25-26). Kerkvliet et al. (2008: 14) for instance report from the south of Vietnam that “local officials 
are overly suspicious” of the wave of newly emerging groups, as they “do not know how to handle” 
them11. According to MARD (2004a), the development of groups in the agricultural sector should 
nonetheless be encouraged. The water sector therefore provides an interesting case study for 
investigating the state-farmer interface. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
called ‘new-style-cooperatives’ are still ideologically supported, strongly promoted and state-sponsored. In 
2008, a total number of 59 agricultural cooperatives were registered with the Agency of Agricultural 
Cooperatives and Rural Development of DARD in Can Tho City (DARD of Can Tho City 2008). 
10
 Grassroots Democracy Decree 29/1998/ND-CP, later amended by Decree 79/2003/ND: Inherent to the 
decree is a famous quotation of Ho Chi Minh: “People know, people discuss, people execute and people 
supervise”.  
11
 The range of community-based groups in Can Tho City includes for instance clubs, which aim to promote the 
joint interests of their members. From various districts, the existence of agriculture extension clubs, gardening 
clubs, nutrition, population and HIV/AIDS clubs, sports clubs, legal clubs, and culture clubs (poetry, traditional 
music) was reported (Interviews with state officials in March 2009). In addition, the formation of micro-credit 
groups started from the mid-1990s, when banking reforms and the breakdown of rural credit cooperatives led 
to the establishment of self-help groups at the hamlet and commune levels (Seibel, 1992: 64; 77f.). The 
establishment of such groups was promoted particularly by mass organisations and clearly reinforced when, in 
the course of Đổi mới, microfinance schemes became a prominent instrument for poverty alleviation (Bloh, 
2007). Many micro-credit groups in Can Tho City use loans to invest in improving sanitation, basically by 
constructing latrines at the household level (Reis and Mollinga, 2009). These micro-credit groups mostly 
operate under the guidance of the Women’s Union and have a predominately female membership.  
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4 The local history and profile of water user groups   
4.1 History of group development  
In Vietnam’s postcolonial history, state-society relations were strictly organised. From the late 1950s, 
the collectivisation of rural households was rigorously enforced by the communist regime and 
continued after reunification (1975), though with little success, particularly in the Mekong Delta12. 
With Đổi mới and the return to household-based agricultural production, membership in agricultural 
cooperatives and groups became voluntary (1988) and the number of these old-style cooperatives 
significantly decreased. Thereafter, farmers enjoyed the freedom of individual production, and group 
development remained weak (Le Meur et al., 2005: 37 f.; Nguyen Ngoc De, 2006: 73-74).  
The spread of high-yielding rice varieties and multiple cropping schemes, however, increasingly 
required collective efforts in water management (Le Meur et al., 2005, Nguyen Duy Can et al., 2007: 
77). Farmers whose fields were located in the same polder or dyke compartment, for instance, 
acknowledged the need to coordinate irrigation and drainage activities and began to engage in new 
group formation processes. These pumping and production groups emerged outside the official 
policy line, since the same farmers had formerly rejected the state’s collectivisation campaign and 
likewise were reluctant to join the new-style cooperatives promoted by the state during the 1990s as 
an alternative model (Fforde, 2008: 17-20). The evolvement of ‘informal cooperatives’ was, by 
consequence, politically sensitive: as Hicks (2004: 297) reports from Long An, central-level officials 
remained rather critical and suspicious when poor farmers decided to pool their meager resources 
and engaged in informal group formation processes. 
In Can Tho City, CBOs first emerged in the mid-1980s, but for about a decade the total number of 
groups remained small. Group formation truly accelerated in the mid-1990s, during which severe 
floods caused dramatic production losses and state agencies finally encouraged farmers to improve 
upon local collaboration (group interviews with farmers, Oct. 2010). Consequently, a considerable 
number of production and irrigation groups were set up and, as provincial statistics indicate, this 
process gathered further momentum during the following decade, when the number of production 
groups more than doubled (DARD of Can Tho City, 2008: 18). With reference to our results, these 
new dynamics in group formation coincide with the expansion of the secondary and tertiary canal 
and dyke systems across the entire province.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
12
 While the membership quota of households in Northern Vietnam reached 96.7 per cent in 1979, the quota in 
the Mekong Delta remained rather low with 24.5 per cent in 1980. Farmers obviously resisted forced 
collectivisation, although nevertheless, by 1983, over 27,000 collective production units were operating across 
the delta (Ngo Vinh Long, 1988), benefiting from state supply of fertilisers and seeds (Nguyen Ngoc De, 2006: 
71-72). LeMeur et al. (2005: 34 ff.) found that most collective production groups and cooperatives disappeared 
later on, even before any official dissolution was enacted by the state. Yet, some of the collective groups 
survived but faced a sharp reduction in their membership (Nguyen Ngoc De, 2006: 77). To date there are 
significant differences between water user groups in the south and in other parts of Vietnam. In northern and 
central Vietnam, water user groups are part of a complex water control management system, which functions 
under irrigation and drainage management companies (IDMCs) and/or state agencies; these groups have a long 
tradition and developed over decades (personal communication with researchers from Can Tho University).  
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Figure 2: Date of group establishment  
 
 
Figure 2 represents the findings from our survey, which covered a total of 64 water user groups. The 
sample includes: 47 production groups (tổ hợp tác sản xuất), 12 irrigation groups (tổ hợp tác bơm 
tưới) and 5 other groups (one club (câu lạc bộ), and four groups which stated that they were 
involved in both production and micro-credit activities. Despite similar features, irrigation and 
production groups differ in several respects. Irrigation groups are loosely structured, concentrate on 
seasonal water management activities and generally dissolve at the end of collective pumping 
campaigns. More than half of the production groups, in contrast, operate throughout the year and 
show a comparatively higher degree of diversification in group activities. These features are 
characteristic of production groups across the whole of the Mekong Delta (Nguyen Ngoc De 2006, 
76f.). 
With respect to their founding history, 36 out of the 64 groups in the sample stated that they had 
been formed out of previously existing groups such as (state-imposed) agricultural collective groups 
(tập đoàn sản xuất) and agricultural cooperatives (hợp tác xã) while a large number of the groups 
started as a new initiative.  
There is ample evidence that the role of state organisations is of crucial importance in terms of 
mobilising, assisting and instructing people to organise in various types of groups. In six out of the 
eight study communes, local officials frequently summon community gatherings, in which they try to 
convince peasants to voluntarily cooperate in groups and organise training on the usefulness of, and 
benefits that arise from, team and group work, in order to encourage group formation. In fact, 38 out 
of 64 groups surveyed reported that local authorities, namely the commune People’s Committee and 
the hamlet head, or the commune branches of the Farmers’ Association and/or the Women’s Union, 
invited them to establish their own group. Differences in group formation patterns can, however, be 
significant: half of the production groups were initiated by local governments and an additional 20 
per cent followed a mass organisation’s call for group establishment. In the case of the irrigation 
groups in contrast, two-thirds (66%) were set up through their members’ own initiatives.  
Official reports show that the provincial government of Can Tho City intends to intensify its campaign 
for mutual collaboration among farmers and also improve the legal conditions for group 
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development (DARD of Can Tho City, 2008). These efforts are embedded in the state-promoted 
concept of the ‘collective economy (kinh tế tập thể)’, which ideologically stems from the pre-reform 
era but is still maintained as a key economic principle of the socialist-oriented market economy, as 
emphasised by the political leadership at the latest 11th Party Congress (Tạp Chí Cộng Sản, 
21.08.2011). With regard to rural production, the collective economy paradigm suggests that 
collaboration among farmers should be institutionalised; it is assumed that farmers’ collaboration 
will produce higher yields than household-based, individual production systems; and state agencies 
are supposed to promote cooperatives, cooperative groups and clubs. The policy implementation is 
perceived as follows: 
With respect to the situation of the collective economy, at present, Vinh Thanh district 
has nine agricultural cooperatives. This means an increase of six cooperatives compared 
to 2007. […] there are 357 cooperative groups and 23 clubs operating in the field of 
agriculture with a total number of 9,779 members. […] It is planned to further 
consolidate and re-establish collective production groups in all hamlets of the districts’ 
communes and towns (Vinh Thanh district Office of Agriculture and Rural Development, 
2009).  
It must nevertheless be noted that bottom-up reporting is crucial for local state cadres who, as a 
consequence, have a strong interest in matching planning targets. The fact that communes or 
hamlets with a high number of such CBOs are rewarded as model villages might further encourage 
local officials to promote as many groups as possible, though in many communities groups exist 
merely on paper (Nguyen Quy Hanh, reporting from his fieldwork in 2010-11 in Can Tho City, oral 
communication 16.11.2011). 
The herein described bureaucratic approach spells out two aspects of group support: first, groups are 
considered a crucial part of any socialist-oriented economy under market conditions; and second, the 
state pursues its strong interest in promoting groups as an ideological/political imperative.  
Regardless of the role of state agencies in CBO development, the respondents‘ motivation to set up 
groups encompasses the anticipation of economic benefits, time-savings and learning opportunities. 
With regard to economic benefits, production and irrigation group members in the survey expected 
to be more productive and raise their income due to cost and time-savings, as well as the sharing of 
knowledge and experience. Beyond the financial dimension, all groups are interested in technical 
innovations and training, as well as various forms of information – which they hope to access through 
their affiliation with state agencies and mass organisations.  
4.2 Group profiles and activities: Towards diversification and 
consolidation  
Production and irrigation groups in Can Tho City are established by neighbouring farmers who 
cultivate land on both sides along a canal and/or within a dyke compartment. Thus, access to land 
constitutes an important precondition of membership in production (77%) and irrigation groups 
(91%). Membership in the group is generally defined by the head of the household (83%); in two 
cases both the head of household and his/her spouse were registered as individual members. Group 
size differs and production groups can be relatively larger; a minimum of 10 members, however, 
seems to be standard. In all production and irrigation groups, men are in superior numbers and 
about one-third of all the groups do not have females at all. In contrast, a single women-only group 
was identified and only one group had a comparatively equal number of females (16) and males (20). 
In all groups, membership is tentatively stable.  
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Table 4: Membership profiles of production and irrigation groups 
 Production groups 
(total: 47) 
Irrigation groups 
(total: 12) 
Minimum number of members 10 14 
Maximum number of members 145 47 
Average number of members  35 29 
Average number of female members  4 4 
Average number of male members  31 25 
Number of groups with 100% male members 13 7 
 
In the study area, farmers tend to specialise in rice, gardening, fishery or aquaculture. The main 
purpose of the groups is to collectively organise pumping and drainage during the flood season, as 
well as carry out irrigation repairs and protection during the dry season (February to April). Pumping 
costs (hiring of pumps and oil for pump operation) are shared among members, while individual 
contributions depend on the actual size of irrigated land per household. Financial contributions of 
members are particularly relevant in irrigation groups (66%), though of less importance in production 
groups (36%). The groups do not hold land titles on behalf of the group and rarely possess collective 
assets – only one-third of all the groups indicated they have a pump, and just five (8%) said they 
operate their own pumping station.  
Approximately half of the groups also engage in group activities in agricultural production, and three 
groups (5%) have purchased agricultural machines. Collaboration in farming includes land 
preparation, seed production, integrated pest management and fish breeding. In addition, labour 
exchange for harvesting is collectively organised. Apart from the productive field, a considerable 
number of groups engage in social welfare and community work as well as education. The operation 
of savings and credit schemes rounds off the groups’ activity profiles. Finally, social welfare 
contributions of group members are considered an important factor in successful group 
performance, since the majority of groups consider poverty as the most important challenge.  
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Table 5: Activities of production and irrigation groups 
Groups main activities  Production groups  Irrigation 
groups  
Production and 
irrigation groups 
(total) 
Irrigation and drainage (pumping) 96 % 92 % 95 % 
Irrigation work maintenance  89 % 92 % 90 % 
Agriculture production 51 % 42 % 49 % 
Social welfare and communal work 36 % 58 % 41 % 
Education and training, incl. health 
education  47 % 33 % 44 % 
Saving and credit schemes 34 % 8 % 29 % 
 
To date, water user groups continue to emerge. How these groups interrelate with local agencies and 
other actors in the management of water for agricultural production will be discussed in the next 
section.  
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5 CBOs in the institutional set up of local water governance  
With regard to production and irrigation groups, the interface of local government and CBOs in the 
water sector encompasses several dimensions, such as administration, regulation and command, 
support and demand systems. These are embedded in the existing local government structure, in 
which CBOs can be considered an integral part, as figure 3 illustrates.  
Figure 3: Organisational setup of irrigation management in Can Tho City (example from Vinh 
Thanh and Co Do districts) 
Sub-department of 
Irrigation and Water 
Management
Department of 
Agriculture and Rural 
Development
Municipal 
People‘s 
Committee
Irrigation Station
(3-6 staff)
Office of Agriculture 
and Rural 
Development
District People‘s 
Committee
Irrigation cadre
Commune
People‘s Committee
Agriculture 
Production 
Steering Board
Hamlet head
Production 
groups
Pumping 
groups
Provincial level
District level
Commune/Ward level
Hamlet level 
(residential area)
command structure
Extension cadre
Source: Designed by authors 
Figure 3 shows that parts of the interface between local state and water user/production groups are 
hierarchically organised under the guidance of various local state agencies. The respective People’s 
Committees take final decisions on all plans and funding arrangements, since they have to approve 
the work plans of the different agencies. Furthermore, People’s Committees provide for the 
legislation of water user groups, including regulations on the establishment, organisational profile 
and operation of groups, partly based on Decree 15113 that defines the organisation and activities of 
cooperative groups such as production groups (Government of Vietnam 2007). 
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 Decree 151 stipulates that cooperative groups (tổ hợp tác) are financially autonomous organisations (tự chủ 
tài chính) that are organized and operate according to the principles of voluntariness (tự nguyện), equality 
(bình đẳng), democracy (dân chủ) and common welfare of its members (cùng có lợi). The decree further 
defines cooperative groups that need to have a minimum of 3 members and need verification from the 
People’s Committee of their commune (Government of Vietnam, 2007). 
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In line with Decree 151, the majority of groups reported that their registration with local authorities 
and mass organisations constituted a common practice in group establishment procedures; that is, 
all production groups and 75% of the irrigation groups were officially registered. Newly established 
groups are supposed to submit a list of members and information on the (elected) group leadership 
via the hamlet heads to the commune People’s Committee. The committee then assesses the group’s 
principles and objectives and finally issues a decision to verify the group’s legal status. Furthermore, 
the Farmers’ Association is assigned to engage with the groups. As a result, almost all production 
groups (97%) and 75 per cent of the irrigation groups in our sample indicated that they were 
operating under the umbrella of the Farmers’ Association. These data suggest that CBOs are 
increasingly subject to a process of formalisation, which is legally manifest in the promulgation of 
Decree 151 in 2007. In 2009, representatives of the Farmers’ Association even made clear that 
informal groups did not exist in their communes, which indicates that the Party’s longstanding efforts 
to assimilate such groups into the body of mass organisations (Marr, 1994) proved effective. The 
representative’s declaration is very interesting, since research in other provinces of the Mekong 
Delta produced evidence of the co-existence of formal and informal groups (Fforde, 2008; Andrew 
Wells-Dang, 2012 oral communication).   
A group’s activity with regard to farming and pumping requires the approval of respective specialised 
agencies. In Vinh Thanh and Co Do districts, an Agriculture Production Steering Board has been 
recently established at both the commune and district levels, in order to assume overall guidance on 
agriculture affairs in the context of the collective economy paradigm. The Board assembles leaders, 
staff and representatives of all institutions involved in agricultural production, namely: 
 The Chairman of the commune People’s Committee 
 The irrigation cadre 
 The commune extension cadre 
 Leadership of the Farmer’s Association (commune level) 
 (By approval of authorities) selected representatives of farmers  
 Hamlet (village) heads 
 
The board monitors the implementation of land use and agricultural production plans and oversees 
related activities. This includes the development and approval of cropping patterns, and pumping 
and drainage schedules as well as the management of hydraulic works. At the commune level, the 
hamlet heads then inform the irrigation and production group heads to implement instructions given 
by the village board. Thus, in view of achieving their aims and targets, the establishment of 
production and irrigation groups in all communes is considered a pivotal instrument. The 
implementation of the official cropping calendar, for instance, is much easier when farmers work 
together to pump, seed and combat pests (District Office of Agriculture and Rural Development of 
Vinh Thanh, 2009). Therefore, irrigation and extension cadres convene a series of meetings with 
farmers’ groups in order to harmonise their respective seasonal work plans. They also strongly argue 
for adopting a common cropping schedule, in order to reduce the risk of crop damage. Finally, they 
arrange for common pumping campaigns. In cases of internal group conflicts (as needs for pumping 
and drainage depend on the farmers’ locations and naturally differ), local authorities intervene and 
try to settle the disputes.  
While material support for agriculture production remains marginal, the vast majority of the groups 
reported that through their membership they gained access to training opportunities (75.8% of 
groups), advice (62.5%) and credit schemes (37.5%). The latter are offered by either mass 
organisations or local agencies, often in collaboration with the Social Policy Bank. From the commune 
People’s Committee, production groups occasionally receive oil to operate their water pumps, while 
extension services offer subsidies for the purchase of seeds. Pest and disease management, as well 
as monitoring visits, were mentioned as advisory services provided. Advanced cultivation techniques 
are disseminated in the form of training, to which group members (registered with the Farmers’ 
Association) seem to have privileged access.  
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6 Financial and labour inputs: Cost ‘sharing’ practices 
Water regulation in the sense of the provision of fresh water for rural production remains the 
predominant and most cost-intensive domain of water resources management in Vietnam, and the 
Mekong Delta in particular (Waibel et al., 2012). Related national investment programmes focus on 
disaster prevention, salinity control in coastal areas and flood control in the upper delta. This 
encompasses dams and water-control structures at all levels. As part of the fiscal decentralisation 
strategy, initiated in 1986, costs are shared among the central and local governments and farmers 
(Biggs et al., 2009: 207). As the following table shows, proportional contributions from the central 
state budget are thereafter reduced (Consultative Group Meeting, 2000: 83):  
Table 2: Allocation of capital investment in water resources development (hydraulic 
infrastructure)  
Year Central budget share Local budget share 
1980 68% 32% 
1990 65% 35% 
1998 57% 43% 
Source: Calculation by authors, based on data from the Ministry of Water, 1994; Consultative Group Meeting, 
2000 
The Mekong Delta investment plan for water control activities 2006-2010, for instance, foresees the 
following contributions: 5 trillion Vietnamese Dong (36%) for the central government, 6 trillion (43%) 
for local governments and 3 trillion (21%) for landowners and villages (Prime Minister, 2006). The 
ministry’s portfolio covers large-scale constructions, while local agencies plan and decide on projects 
with smaller budgets (up to 5 billion Vietnamese Dong). Required farmer contributions are fixed by 
policymakers, since participatory planning approaches are still lacking (Pham Cong Huu, 2011). With 
regard to water supply for rural production, for instance, the government provides for the creation 
and maintenance of main and secondary canals in the delta, while the responsibility for tertiary and 
lower level canals is left to the water users, namely peasant communities (Nguyen Xuan Tiep, 2008a: 
233). The example of Can Tho City demonstrates that the farmers’ financial contributions are quite 
significant: 
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Table 3: Can Tho City budget for water resources development and infrastructure f rom 2006 to 
2008, aggregated 
 Investment (in million 
Vietnamese Dong) 
Ratio in percents 
State funds (different sources) 56,077 83% 
Irrigation fee14 (paid by 
farmers) 
2,965 4% 
Farmer’s “voluntary” 
contributions 
8,429 13% 
Provincial budget in total 67,471 100% 
Source: Sub-department of Water and Irrigation Management (DARD Can Tho City), calculation based on 
various annual reports  
The  administrative and fiscal decentralisation in the hydraulic sector started as early as the 1980s, 
when the central state established provincial irrigation and drainage management companies 
(IDMCs) responsible for hydraulic head works operations and maintenance (Barker et al., 2004: 27; 
Fontenelle et al., 2007: 170). As financially self-sufficient public service providers, the IDMCs started 
to collect irrigation fees from farmers. In the Mekong Delta, IDMCs were first set up in Soc Trang, Can 
Tho and Vinh Long provinces during the 1990s, which was considered a significant step in shifting 
costs to the local level (interviews with provincial authorities in 2009). Subsequently, the share of 
local government investment in hydraulic infrastructure has continually increased in recent decades 
(see Table 3).  
Farmers also have to contribute cash and manpower to the construction and maintenance of 
irrigation infrastructure, which includes tertiary canals, border dykes and small ditches (interviews 
with district state agencies in Can Tho City, 2009). With the introduction of double rice cropping and 
the spread of water control structures, an irrigation fee (thủy lợi phí) was introduced (in 1984 and 
first collected in 1991) in order to devolve some of the emerging investment costs to the farmers. 
However, the controversial levy was difficult to collect and was finally abolished in 2009 (Ministry of 
Finance, 2009).15 The impact of the decision has not been examined yet, but findings from our 
research suggest that alternative mechanisms are in place to allocate water users’ financial and non-
                                                     
14
 The irrigation fee was removed in Can Tho City in 2009.  
15
 Despite nationwide regulation, only about two-thirds of the provinces collected the irrigation fee from 2004 
– ‘06 (Nguyen Xuan Tiep, n.y.); in Ca Mau, Mekong Delta, for instance, local authorities considered the fee 
inappropriate for the given natural-ecological conditions for farming, and in Soc Trang farmers refused to pay 
(the head of the sub-department of Irrigation and Water Management of DARD, Soc Trang, interview 
19.05.2009). The required amount depended on the size of the irrigated land and the local farming system 
itself (vice head of sub-department of Irrigation and Water Management, DARD Tien Giang, My Tho, interview 
03.06.2009). Therefore, irrigation fees varied. The lowest rates were charged in mountainous areas (VND 
566,000 (US$28) per hectare per crop), while the highest amounts were collected in the Red River Delta (more 
than VND one million ($50) per hectare per crop) (Vietnam News, 19.02.2011). Irrigation fees were often 
estimated as too high, in particular for poor farmers, and significant gaps in view of covering the costs for 
maintenance and new investments still remained. With the abolition of the irrigation fee, local officials were 
not only relieved from collecting the fees but also received direct and comparatively higher funding from the 
central government (interview, vice head of Sub-department of Irrigation and Water Management, DARD Can 
Tho City, 10.11.2008). 
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financial contributions to construction and maintenance works. In Can Tho City, water users’ 
Obligations, as defined by local governments for instance, include the following (results from group 
interviews in all study communes): 
 Digging of on-farm and tertiary canals by hand (provision of manpower: one person per 
household for a specified number of days); alternatively, and in the case of the use of 
machines, a monetary fee is collected. In contrast, public labour campaigns (formerly 
common in the delta) have almost vanished. 
 Dredging of on-farm canals; all costs and labour input covered by farmers. 
 Financial contributions for the implementation of the annual canal dredging plan of the 
district People’s Committee (primary and secondary canals).16 
 Financial contributions for the construction of new and rehabilitation of existing dykes. 
 Development and implementation of seasonal cropping calendars, including pumping. 
 Participation in meetings organised by mass organisations and local state agencies, where 
plans for dredging, pumping and cropping are approved and/or training on the usefulness of 
team and group work is delivered. 
 In view of managing the above-listed tasks, CBOs increasingly come into play.  
 Water management and community-based organisations. 
 
The management of hydraulic infrastructure appears to be a complex and expensive task. As 
mentioned earlier, being spatially defined by a canal grid or square-shaped dyke walls, irrigation and 
production groups constitute the smallest unit of hydraulic management in the Mekong Delta. In Co 
Do district, for instance, production groups are organised according to physical hydro-agricultural 
structures such as dyke polders that serve flood protection. Within their polders, dwellers assume 
tasks in managing and maintaining the infrastructural interplay of canals, dykes and sluices for water 
regulation. These groups therefore constitute an integral part of the hierarchical structure of 
hydraulic works operation and maintenance, ranging from the ministerial to the hamlet level (Doan 
The Loi, n.d.). 
Local agencies oversee the secondary and tertiary canal system and the People’s Committees 
compile annual canal dredging plans. The plans’ development is based on a consultation process in 
which all stakeholders are supposed to be involved. Firstly, hamlet heads collect farmers’ 
requirements for the rehabilitation of existing canals and submit them to the commune People’s 
Committee. Secondly, the committee assigns the irrigation and transport cadre to conduct a survey, 
estimate costs and draft a dredging plan. Thirdly, a series of meetings with farmers is organised in 
which the draft plan and farmers’ contributions are discussed. Based on the slogan ‘state and people 
work together (Nhà nước và nhân cùng làm)’, investment costs are shared between the state and the 
farmers, although shares can vary and depend on the project size and scale. The final approval is 
issued by the district authorities. 
So-called ‘farmer’s voluntary contributions’ are then collected by the hamlet heads from each 
production and irrigation group. Depending on the investment scheme, state authorities sign 
contracts with dredging companies on behalf of the groups. If several groups are involved in the 
dredging exercise because a longer canal cuts across their land, the commune People’s Committee 
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 The required contribution is calculated on the basis of land ownership: for 3 meter-large rice fields an 
amount of 80,000 VND must be paid. The total amount to be collected by local agencies can be considerable: In 
2008, for example, farmers in Co Do, Vinh Thanh and Thot Not districts contributed about VND 2.5 billion for 
canal dredging and embankment/dyke rehabilitation (DARD of Can Tho City, 2009; various annual reports).  
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coordinates the activities and manages the funds. During the implementation process, farmers 
participate in monitoring and supervision as well as in the final inspection and acceptance of the 
dredged canals.  
Dykes constitute another important part of the local water control system. Dyke projects are 
similarly planned and funded as secondary and tertiary canals, and farmers also have to contribute 
cash and labour. This is required for both the upgrading and the construction of new dykes. Farmers’ 
approval of dyke projects cannot be taken for granted, as Howie (2011, 243f.) reports from 
neighboring An Giang province: 
The proposal needs grass-roots agreement, if people disagree […] even if there was a 
51% vote in favour it will not get built. The 51% will not make the investment if they 
know the other 49% will not pay their share. There is no way to force the 49% into 
paying. If 70% agreed then [it is] likely everyone would pay. Completely different to the 
time before Đổi mới, when the government would have made the decision and invested 
the money. 
Dyke rehabilitation works usually go hand in hand with canal dredging, using the silt dredged out of 
canals to consolidate and update dyke walls that run parallel to the corresponding canal. Usually, 
both activities are carried out simultaneously during the dry season, when the water level in canals 
and rivers is at its lowest level. In Can Tho City, these annual “dry season irrigation rehabilitation 
campaigns” are coordinated by district and commune authorities and constitute an integral part of 
the ever-expanding array of hydraulic infrastructure (Miller, 2003: 256; Biggs et al., 2009: 216). CBOs 
actually organise the financial and workmanship contributions, but in case of unforeseen damages, 
local authorities can also provide additional funds for rehabilitation works. Beyond these low level 
interventions, dyke system development remains a strategic and major concern of provincial and 
central authorities.  
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7 Conclusion  
The recent evolution of Can Tho City’s rural production and water resources management systems 
provide a good example of the implementation of a centrally planned agriculture policy, following 
the paradigms of economic growth, food security and old-style command and control principles 
typical for the sector (Asian Development Bank, 2008: 47). Heavy investment is still being undertaken 
to expand the existing water control system and central agencies maintain their authority over large-
scale infrastructure projects. At the same time, economic deregulation, privatisation, socialisation 
and (fiscal) decentralisation have shifted related financial responsibilities from the central state to 
local level administrations and society. With regard to farmers and water users, the state maintains a 
leading role in directing and controlling their respective activities. The establishment of Agriculture 
Production Steering Boards, which manage water resources and issue agricultural land and 
production plans, provides a good example of corresponding institutional reform. Furthermore, mass 
organisations have become increasingly involved in managing state and farmer interfaces. 
A second strand of the paper showed how local farming systems have been subject to change. As 
individualism and a frontier spirit (Jamieson, 1995: 5) were characteristic of the region, settlements 
in the Mekong delta grew along canal and river banks and were traditionally loosely structured. Prior 
to the Green Revolution, water management for agrarian use was basically done at the household 
level, because “nature provided a system of irrigation that required almost no extra labour and little 
organised cooperation between individuals and communities on shared waterways” (Biggs et al., 
2009: 213). Efforts of the government to implement collectivisation after 1975 more or less failed. 
Nonetheless, the modernisation of rural production triggered the need for farmers to organise on-
farm canal digging and maintenance as well as drainage and pumping activities.  
The paper further analysed the emergence of different types of water user groups in the Mekong 
Delta. Although a number of CBOs originated from the old-style cooperatives or collective groups, 
this seems to be rather the exception than the rule. As the literature and survey data suggest, a 
number of CBOs began to informally emerge as loosely structured groups from the 1990s onwards. 
The government later on produced a corresponding legal framework, such as the guidelines for the 
establishment of water user groups and Decree 151, and related agencies subsequently issued 
directives for the lower levels of administration to engage in the promotion of such groups.  
Group formation became subject to administrative procedures. Nowadays mass organisations and 
district offices hold records of CBOs operating in their constituencies and, officially, informal groups 
no longer exist. Nonetheless, local statistics seem to be inaccurate in that a substantial number of 
registered organisations exist merely on paper. Local authorities have also raised concerns that group 
activities are fragile as they are mostly seasonal and temporary; moreover, they have complained 
about a lack of willingness among farmers to engage in community-based collective activities.  
The narrative of the surveyed groups also suggests that apart from encouraging group formation, 
mass organisations and state organs attempt to monitor their activities. As has been argued, CBOs 
are actively used by the state to mobilise revenues and the labour force. Moreover, agriculture 
policies and new technologies are actively disseminated through training programmes, which first 
and foremost target farmers registered with the Farmers’ Association and provide them with training 
that coincides with rural development and agriculture extension policies of local authorities. Finally, 
local authorities appeal to farmers to adopt their operations to a joint cropping pattern and pumping 
scheme, which are designed to meet the planned production targets. 
Linking the threads of rural development policy, agrarian change and CBO development, the current 
dynamics at the grassroots reflect a process which, referring to Kerkvliet, can be understood as 
‘everyday politics’ (2005): By inscribing the emergence of CBOs into its collective economy agenda 
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and incorporating CBOs into the traditional system of state corporatism17 and respective local 
governance structure, the state has merely responded to an already existing reality, namely the 
development of informal groups. Initially, these groups lacked a legal foundation, since the 
government of Vietnam restricted and critically oversaw the development and operation of civic 
organisations. Since then, the legal framework has been modified and water users and other 
production groups are being promoted as integral parts of rural development policy. Thus, the 
practice of top-down state management and collectively organised production has by no means 
vanished from the state agenda, despite the return to household-based production.  
The process of water user group evolvement in the Mekong Delta bears some affinities to other post-
socialist and state-centric regimes. In Central Asian countries, as well as in Vietnam, the state 
obviously remains the dominant force in water resources management, despite the many 
administrative and economic reforms. With the introduction of grassroots democracy and 
participatory approaches to community development the Vietnamese state aimed at integrating 
water user groups and other self-initiated CBOs into formalised governance structures of the Leninist 
state model and created a range of mechanisms to manage the groups-state interface (reporting 
schemes, meetings and trainings, visits and observations, among others). Only groups that register 
with their local authorities are considered legal entities, which is also a precondition for gaining 
access to government support schemes. What has really changed is the rhetoric, notably pronounced 
in the idea of voluntarism (tự nguyện hợp tác) and people’s participation. Indeed, participation 
appears increasingly in terms of monetary contributions, but not necessarily in terms of decision-
making power: 
In many cases, the people’s participation is “legalized” with a stamped document of the 
People’s Committee although it does not show fully people’s comments. Consequently, 
the work [hydraulic works] constructed with the improper planning and design will be 
ineffective and people’s responsibilities for investment, construction and management 
are not linked to their benefits. (Nguyen Xuan Tiep, 2008c: 241) 
The fact that local authorities are increasingly dependent on farmers’ voluntary contributions to 
cover constantly growing investment needs in water infrastructure might have enhanced the 
bargaining power of farmers and farmers’ groups. With reference to Scott’s concept of hidden rural 
resistance (Scott 1985) and Kerkvliet’s accounts of peasant-state relations in Vietnam (2005), farmers 
do not necessarily conform to state directives but find ways to resist state decisions and produce 
bottom-up pressure. For the Mekong Delta, Miller (2003: 255) reported from Tra Vinh that farmers 
abandoned unpopular canals constructed by the state. In Soc Trang and Can Tho City, state officials 
reported that farmers were reluctant to pay the irrigation fee and made its collection an unprofitable 
procedure (interviews in 2008 & 2009), while peasants resisted communal dyke planning projects in 
An Giang (Howie, 2011). In the coastal province of Bac Lieu, farmers who were in disagreement with 
central state policies on rice intensification even demolished large-scale salinity control structures to 
access brackish water for shrimp farming (Duong Van Ni 2012).   
Through their refusal to make payments and give consent, and other forms of hidden resistance, 
farmers may be able to force local authorities to improve upon investigating and considering water 
user needs in their constituencies. Within the hierarchical structure of water resources management, 
however, local authorities are bound to fulfill planning targets defined at higher levels. Decision-
making, production and investment plans thereby remain subject to contestations which play out at 
the interfaces of state bureaucracies and in the local governance arena.  
Nevertheless, in the increasingly centralised water management environment, paradoxically the 
state makes use of the idea of decentralisation to shift investment and recovery costs in water 
                                                     
17
 Term used by Kerkvliet to define one of the three dimensions typically used to characterize state-society 
relations in contemporary Vietnam (2003: 30).  
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infrastructure to the local level and society. Howie, for instance, reports from An Giang about the 
centralisation of water scheme management in the context of high-dyke constructions. Decisions 
were imposed on farmers and formerly cooperating pumping groups dissolved when the state took 
full control over water regulations through head works (Howie, 2011: 291-293). Nevertheless, this is 
not a contradiction of what has been found in Can Tho City, but rather a complementary feature. 
Liberalisation of the rural economy and the spread of modern hydraulic agriculture come with clear 
limitations for farmers, and the central state is able to impose its food security/agriculture policy 
through a number of mechanisms. Thus, in the case of rural production, water users’ CBOs are 
wedged between tendencies of centralisation and decentralisation. As a result of more liberal 
policies, CBOs have also identified a range of benefits from group formation. As many of them also 
develop complementary activities in the areas of savings schemes and social welfare programmes, 
new prospects for collaborative engagement at the community level may emerge in the future.  
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 Annex: Table 6: The institutional landscape of local water 
management in Can Tho City 
  
Source: Composition by authors, based on research in Can Tho City, 2009 to 2010 and the work of Nguyen Thi 
Phuong Loan, 2010a; 2010b 
Mandates, tasks 
and activities 
State agencies in 
 
Non-state actors 
Provinces/municipalities Districts/wards Communes/towns 
Water quality 
monitoring and 
environmental 
management 
Department of Natural 
Resources and 
Environment (DONRE): 
Centre for 
Environmental 
Monitoring; Agency of 
Mineral Resources, 
Water, and 
Hydrometeorology 
Office of 
Environment and 
Natural Resources 
People’s 
Committee 
 
Rural water supply 
and sanitation 
Department of 
Agriculture and Rural 
Development (DARD): 
Provincial Center for 
Rural Water Supply and 
Sanitation (CERWASS) 
Office of Agriculture 
and Rural 
Development 
(partly irrigation 
station) 
People’s 
Committee, 
managers of rural 
water supply 
stations under 
CERWASS 
Women’s Union, 
Farmer’s Association, 
saving and micro-credit 
groups 
Urban water supply 
and sanitation 
Department of 
Construction (DoC): 
municipal supply and 
sewage company 
Subsidiaries of the 
municipal water 
supply and sewage 
company 
People’s 
Committee, 
subsidiaries of 
municipal water 
supply and sewage 
companies 
Women’s Union, 
Farmer’s Association, 
saving and micro-credit 
groups 
Irrigation and 
drainage services, 
hydraulic works 
maintenance 
(canals, sluices, 
pumping stations, 
dykes) 
DARD: Agency of Water 
Resources & Storm and 
Flood Control 
Office of Agriculture 
and Rural 
Development 
(irrigation station) 
People’s 
Committee 
(irrigation service) 
Agricultural 
cooperatives, pumping 
cooperatives, farmers 
groups, Farmer’s 
Association, private and 
formerly state-controlled 
dredging, and 
construction firms 
Disaster prevention 
(flood and storm 
control) 
DARD: Agency of Water 
Resources & Flood and 
Storm Control 
Office of Agriculture 
and Rural 
Development 
(irrigation station) 
People’s 
Committee 
Red Cross, mutual aid 
groups 
Aquaculture and 
fisheries 
DARD: Agency of 
Fisheries and 
Aquaculture 
Office of Agriculture 
and Rural 
Development 
(aquaculture 
station) 
People’s 
Committee 
(agricultural 
extension service) 
Aquaculture 
cooperatives, 
Association of Fisheries, 
fish processors, fish 
farmers 
Water-related 
health issues 
Department of Health 
(DoH): Centre of 
Preventive Heath 
Office of Health 
People’s 
Committee (health 
station) 
Women’s Union, saving 
and micro-credit groups 
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